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PEER-REVIEWED ARTICLE
Reality Television and Politics in the Arab World:
Preliminary Observations
By Marwan M. Kraidy
Abstract
The most popular and controversial television programs in the Arab world are
“reality” shows like Super Star and Star Academy, broadcast by satellite to
viewers from Morocco to Iraq. These shows claim to be live, non-scripted and
therefore "real". Many rely on audience participation in the form of voting for
favorite contestants. In the wake of controversy triggered by Super Star and
Star Academy, some observers have hailed reality television as a harbinger of
democracy in the Arab world. This article explores the complex ways in which
Arab reality television can be described as political and poses questions about
the role of reality programs in the Pan-Arab public sphere. Based on fieldwork,
textual analysis, and interviews with television producers and market
researchers, this article concludes with preliminary observations on the
political implications of Arab reality television.
Introduction
Reality television (1) entered Arab public discourse in the last five years at a
time of significant turmoil in the region: escalating violence in Iraq, contested
elections in Egypt, the struggle for women’s political rights in Kuwait, political
assassinations in Lebanon, and the protracted Arab-Israeli conflict. This geopolitical crisis environment that currently frames Arab politics and ArabWestern relations is the backdrop to the controversy surrounding the social
and political impact of Arab reality television, which assumes religious, cultural
or moral manifestations. This article explores the connections between Arab
reality television and the political, economic and socio-cultural forces that
animate contemporary Arab public discourse. It offers observations on how
public contention about reality television articulates these forces to issues such
as inter-Arab relations, democratization and political participation. The article
concludes with questions, to be addressed in future research, about the ways
in which public contention around reality television overlaps and spills into Arab
political life.
Specifically, this article offers preliminary analysis of public discourse
surrounding three reality television programs, Super Star, Al Ra’is, and Star
Academy, used as comparative case-studies to map the dynamics of
contention in the Pan-Arab public sphere. The analysis is based on seven
months of fieldwork in Beirut and Dubai in 2004 and 2005, including more than
100 interviews with people involved in production, promotion, evaluation, and
research on the audience of Arab reality television programs, in addition to
textual analysis of around 50 hours of the programs themselves.(2) This initial
research indicates that reactions to Arab reality television fall in two broad
camps. On one hand, there is a large group of young people and adults who
follow reality television programs, some of them more or less regular viewers,
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others avid fans, making some reality television shows the most popular
programs in Arab television history. On the other hand, there is a relatively
small but vocal minority of religious leaders and political activists who have
condemned reality television because in their judgment it violates Islamic
principles of social interaction and/or facilitates cultural globalization
characterized by Western values of individualism, consumerism, and sexual
promiscuity.
This article recognizes that opinions on reality television in the Arab region are
more diverse than the two broad categories mentioned above, including those
who dismiss reality television on the grounds that it is contrived dramatically,
mediocre artistically, or simply not very interesting. To that end, it seeks to
distinguish competing political, religious and economic discourses that are
compelled into public debate on the impact of reality television on Arab
societies. This article is drawn from a working book manuscript,(3) and
therefore it is best construed as offering a set of preliminary observations
rather that definite interpretation. These observations will focus on the
overlaps between popular culture and politics in the context of the public
controversy surrounding reality television, within the framework of the
relationship between the broad categories of “politics” and “entertainment.”
Politics and Entertainment
Long treated as two distinct and separate spheres, the realms of politics and
entertainment have become increasingly related in mass mediated societies
where they both rely on celebrity and public recognition. The overlap is
probably most pronounced in the United States since 1992, when presidential
candidate William Jefferson Clinton played his saxophone on MTV. This issue
took surreal dimensions nearly a decade later when World Wrestling
Federation ex-star Jesse “The Body” Ventura won the governorship of
Minnesota as a third party candidate against two powerful mainstream
opponents. In the late 1990s, US television, from celebrity gossip shows to
serious network news, was abuzz with rumors of Hollywood stars and
business tycoons running for political office: Warren Beatty, Clint Eastwood
and Donald Trump were imputed political ambitions, rumors that most of them
did nothing to undermine. Even after the September 11, 2001 attacks on the
United States, when pundits proclaimed the end of both innocence and
insouciance, and the return to more serious matters of state, Arnold
Schwarzenegger, Austrian-born Mister Universe turned Hollywood action
hero, was elected governor of the American state of California. Michael
Moore’s Academy Awards diatribe against George W. Bush in 2004 was
watched by millions throughout the world, triggering widespread commentary
in the international and Arab press. The United States continues to be, in the
words of Neil Gabler, the “republic of mass entertainment.”(4)
Elsewhere in the world, the connection is less patent, but signs of it exist
everywhere. The transformation of Cicciolina from porn-star to member of the
Italian parliament, Bob Geldof’s crusade for debt relief in the developing world,
and Indian movie stars dabbling in politics, are all indications of blurring
boundaries between entertainment and politics, with most “cross-overs” being
from the former to the latter. In Egypt, Lebanon and Saudi Arabia, newspaper
cartoons and comedic television programs have long been a platform for
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caustic political satire, with the special Ramadan broadcast of Tash ma Tash,
a Saudi television comedy, stirring controversy in Saudi Arabia at the time of
this writing.(5) The connection between politics and entertainment in the
developing world sometimes takes indirect forms. In India, the television
broadcasts of the historical Hindu epics, Ramayana and Mahabharata, were
concomitant with a changing political landscape, and by some accounts, to the
redefinition of politics in India.(6) In Latin America, telenovelas often take on
politicized socio-economic themes.
In most of the non-Western world, cultural production is an arena where
various forces struggle to define national identity in ways that are more
contentious than in the West. For example, the commoditization of the female
body in popular culture, which in the West is often marginally discussed as a
moral issue, creates major controversies in the non-Western world, where
women’s roles are central to historical memory and national identity. In short,
the impact of entertainment television on public discourse in developing
countries(7) is explained by “popular culture’s ability to produce and articulate
feelings [that] can become the basis of an identity, and that identity can be the
source of political thought and action.”(8)
That popular culture creates identities with political potential, or perhaps more
accurately, that it integrates already existing group identities and serves as a
platform for their exaltation in public discourse, is made clear by the
controversy surrounding Arab reality television. Reality television broadcasts
are public events in Arab countries, compelling various actors to articulate
competing social identities and political agendas in a process of public
contention whose objective is to favor one or another vision of the good
society.(9) Because of its high visibility, popular culture in general and reality
television specifically, is a magnet for contentious politics because the
upheaval over its implications for Arab societies stands for a larger, ongoing
debate about Arab-Western relations and socio-cultural change. The overlap
between popular culture and politics exposes fault-lines in Arab societies as
the popularity and controversial status of reality television brings to the surface
latent socio-political tensions.
To illustrate these processes of contention, this article takes three reality
television shows as case-studies. The first is Super Star, the Arab version of
Pop Idol or American Idol, the second is Star Academy, the Arab version of
Fame Academy, and the third is Al Ra’is, the Arabic version of Big Brother(10)
. The first was produced by Future Television, a Lebanese channel owned by
the family of the late Rafiq al-Hariri; the second was launched by the
Lebanese Broadcasting Corporation (LBC); the third was broadcast by the
Dubai-based, Saudi-owned Middle East Broadcasting Center (MBC).
Superstar and Star Academy were shot in Lebanon, Al Ra’is in Bahrain. The
first two have been extremely popular among Arab audiences and have
garnered record advertising rates, with Star Academy being unequivocally the
most popular and probably the most controversial satellite television program
in Arab history. The third program, Al Ra’is was shut down one week after it
went on the air in 2004, due to intense controversy including street
demonstrations in Manama, Bahrain’s capital. Public discourse around these
programs illustrates how various groups use them to articulate and legitimate
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competing ideological agendas. In particular, after exploring the emergence of
nationalist speech in tandem with reality television broadcasts, my
observations focus on how business and religious leaders, among others, use
the visibility of reality television to increase the public’s exposure to their
views.
Reality Television and Inter-Arab Rivalries
Developments in the Arab media industry during the last 15 years are
dominated by a trend towards regionalization.(11) Nationally oriented
terrestrial television channels and national daily newspapers remain popular
and influential in some Arab countries, but regional satellite television
channels such as Al Jazeera, Al Arabiya, LBC and MBC, and regional
newspapers such as Al Hayat, Asharq Al Awsat and Al Quds Al Arabi, all
three London-based, have a strong following and usually set the terms and
rhythm of Pan-Arab public discourse. Like other regional media industries in
Latin America and South East Asia, Arab satellite television tends to produce
programs that appeal at once to city dwellers in Baghdad and Casablanca and
to rural viewers in the Egyptian sa’id and the Lebanese jurd, although it is
mostly focused on urban middle-class viewers that appeal to advertisers.
Additional trends underscoring Arab satellite television’s trans-regional mode
of address include (1) the development of what is now known as “white
Arabic,” a media compatible, simplified version of Standard Modern Arabic that
is becoming a lingua franca for regional public discourse, (2) the advent of
stars with regional appeal (whether they are journalists, program hosts,
singers, or to a lesser extent, actors) and (3) the standardization of production
practices in Beirut, Cairo and Dubai.(12)
At another level, the rising popularity of television formats that Arab channels
purchase from the Netherlands and the United Kingdom and then adapt to
Arab audiences has brought to Arab screens a flurry of what can be called
“hybrid” programs because they combine a “global” format developed in
Western Europe or the United States, with “local” content that appeals to the
cultural sensibilities of specific audiences. In 2004 and 2005, many media
executives in Beirut and Dubai said to me that “the gossip in the [satellite
television] industry used to be about who is creating what, and now the gossip
is about who is purchasing which format.” In my interviews with satellite
television professionals, there were no indications of dissatisfaction with this
situation, since in most cases importing program ideas and adapting them is
less arduous than creating original programs(13) Clearly, television format
adaptation suits satellite television channels because it allows them to bypass
several steps in the production process and to fashion programs for a PanArab audience living between Rabat and Baghdad. The resulting productions
mix elements from “East” and “West” and draw on the cultural repertoires of
various Arab countries. The cultural hybridity of these programs, and many of
them belong to the reality genre, contributes to unpredictable audience
reactions and, as we shall see shortly, heated public debates.(14)
Regionalization is well established in the Arab satellite television industry as a
business and marketing strategy. Many promotion and marketing managers I
spoke with in Beirut and Dubai wax lyrical when conjuring up visions of a PanArab audience whose millions of viewers transcend inter-Arab divisions.
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Politically and culturally, however, regionalization is skin deep, as
demonstrated by expressions of rivalry between Arabs from different countries
during the 2003 broadcast of Future Television’s Super Star. Launched with
great success in 2003, this Arabic version of Pop Idol raised Future
Television’s stature both nationally and regionally as thousands of Arabs
auditioned to participate in the program and millions watched and voted for
their favorite contestants. Super Star rested on the basic premise of singers
performing on stage in front of three jurors. Elias al-Rahbani, member of
Lebanon’s most famous musical family, donned edgy eyewear and black
turtlenecks to play the role of juror-in-chief, a convincing if a bit contrived
copycat of Simon Cowell, the acerbic music producer and jury leader in the
American version of the show, American Idol.(15)
As it reached its final weeks, Super Star’s competition turned from an artistic
competition between individual contestants to an international rivalry in which
each contender was primarily performing as a representative of their
country.(16) From the early weeks of the program, viewers could see the flag
waving by the in-studio audience, and text messages feeding into television
tickers depicted patriotic statements often accompanied by icons of national
flags whose on-screen appearance was made possible by Multimedia
Messaging Service. Even before the last couple of weeks when the
competition intensified significantly, there were reports that voting was
occurring on national bases, which meant that the wealthy inhabitants of the
countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council (Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar,
Saudi Arabia, and United Arab Emirates) would give Super Star contestants
from those countries an edge in the competition. However, with the presence
of the jury, artistic talent was a determining factor,(17) and the three semifinalists were a Jordanian woman, a Lebanese man and a Syrian man. This
combination of nationalities created controversy. When the Lebanese
competitor was eliminated in the semi-final, riots broke out in Beirut and fans
stormed the stage in protest, as Lebanese converged to the studios in large
demonstrations. Fuelling this discontent was a rampant rumor that Syrian
political pressure led to the elimination of the Lebanese candidate. Syria,
euphemistically dubbed by Western news agencies as Lebanon’s “power
broker,” in fact micro-managed all Lebanese affairs until Syrian troops
withdrew from Lebanon in April 2005 under the combined pressure of massive
street demonstrations in Beirut and United Nations resolution 1559 cosponsored by France and the United States. Until the withdrawal, the head of
Syrian military intelligence in Lebanon was the de facto ruler of the country,
and the Lebanese believed that very little happened in Lebanon without Syrian
approval or intervention. It was therefore not surprising that Lebanese viewers
were suspicious about the transparency of the process that led to the
elimination of their national contestant.
In addition to these complicating issues between Lebanon and Syria, modern
Jordanian-Syrian relations have been riddled with tension for various political
reasons, including Syrian resentment about the Hashemite monarchy’s
historically compromising stance towards Israel. The voting frenzy surrounding
Super Star became a competition between these countries. When Super Star
fever reached Syria itself, telecommunications companies installed billboards
on Damascus thoroughfares promoting the Syrian contestant and exhorting
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Syrians to perform their national duty and vote for him. In interviews with
Western press agencies, Syrians on the street were unequivocal: They were
voting for him because he was Syrian. The fact that he was a good performer
was just fine, but his national identity was the primary motivation for their
participation in the show.(18) Special mobile telephone lines were devoted to
the endeavor. In Jordan, rumors spread of a full-fledged national mobilization.
King Abdallah himself was reported to have instructed officers in the Jordanian
armed forces to issue orders to the soldiers under their command to vote for
Diana Carazon, the Jordanian candidate who ultimately was crowned
“Superstar of the Arabs.” Businesses exploited the situation as a marketing
opportunity, with an ice cream parlor offering free ice cream for those who vote
for Diana Carazon, and a car dealership took an ad in the daily Al-Dustour
advertising a 2003 sedan that it would give to Diana Carazon.(19) Jordan’s
telecommunications companies, who were poised to make large profits from
their share of the voting bills,(20) entered the fray, with Fastlink and Mobile
Com pledging “full support” and launching a daily print advertising campaign
urging readers to support the Jordanian contestant and vote for her(21) .
Super Star stimulated patriotic feelings among its viewers that were exploited
by political leaders and the corporate world. As an Associated Press wire
report described it, “Arab ‘Idol’ [was] a Battle of Nations.”(22) This battle was
all the more visible because of the enormous Pan-Arab audience that Future
Television’s flagship program attracted: More than 30 million viewers watched
the finale of Super Star 1,(23) and 4.8 million voted, 52 percent for Diana
Carazon.(24) The division of passions and votes according to national
affiliations undermines claims that Pan-Arab satellite television is uniting Arabs
“from the (Atlantic) Ocean the (Persian) Gulf” in one community of feeling.
While there are burning issues with transnational appeal, such as the plight of
Palestinians and Iraqis under occupation, they appear to cede the way, even if
temporarily, to more provincial affirmations of patriotism in the course of voting
in popular reality television programs such as Super Star.
Unlike Star Academy and Al Ra’is, Super Star did not trigger a major “moral
panic.” Rather, it elicited commentary that is clearly political. The Islamic
Action Front, a Jordanian political formation with ties to the Muslim
Brotherhood, issued a “Press Statement Surrounding the Program Super
Star,” condemning it for “promoting cultural globalization” and the
Americanization of Islamic values, but the debate in Jordan fizzled away as a
Jordanian won the competition. In the second installment [Superstar 2, 2004],
a Palestinian contestant from the West Bank town of Salfit, Ammar Hassan,
rose to favorite contestant status, partly to the Arab public’s sympathy for the
Palestinians. On the nights when he performed, the 12,000 residents of Salfit
stayed indoors, glued to their screens, and when he rose to the finals against
the Libyan Eyman Al-Atar, 2,000 people gathered in a Salfit park to watch
together, chanting “Ammar, Ammar, Super Star!” In spite of this popularity,
Hamas condemned Palestinian reactions to Super Star in the following
statement:
“Our people are in need of heroes, resistance fighters, and contributors to
building the country and are not in need of singers, corruption mongers, and
advocates of immorality” (25)
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That reactions to Super Star are explicitly articulated in political and ideological
terms should not obscure the tendency of such public controversies to blur the
boundaries between the political, socio-cultural and moral realms. Super
Star’s format itself was acceptable to all but the most radical Islamist
interpretations of social behavior, since candidates sang on a stage facing a
jury from a relatively significant distance and there was little interaction or
physical contact between men and women. This was not the case with other
Arab reality television programs, such as Al Ra’is or Star Academy, where
stage proxemics emerged as a key reason for outrage in some quarters of the
Arab public. The controversies associated with Big Brother and Star Academy
reveal that these debates are better understood as involving a complex tug-ofwar between different contenders rather than a simple binary opposition
between morally controversial forms of popular culture and morally strict
speakers in the name of Islam.
Reality Television, Business and Religion
It is a well-rehearsed cliché that Islam pervades Arab socio-cultural and
political fabrics. The validity of this proposition suffers from periodic episodes
of over-stretch when some observers of the Arab world rely on Islam as an allencompassing determinant of social relations to the detriment of other factors,
the relevance of which may be obscured by religious determinism. The
following episode points to the continued emergence of neo-liberal speech in
the Arab public sphere, and that even when arguments that claim a basis in
Islam win, they increasingly are contested. When the Middle East
Broadcasting Center (MBC) interrupted the shooting and broadcasting of Al
Ra’is only a week after it began in Bahrain in February 2004, virtually all
reports on the incident in the press credited¬ –-or blamed—Islamic
activists.(26) While a demonstration by Islamists against the show did occur,
the Al Ra’is episode was not a simple chain of cause-and-effect that press
renditions suggested. Rather, as we shall discuss shortly, it was a complex
issue that triggered debate in the Bahraini parliament and involved arguments
counter to those of the Islamists.(27)
The upheaval surrounding Al Ra’is illustrates that business interests have
become powerful enough to contest ostensibly religious arguments in public
debate in countries of the Arabian Gulf. According to press reports, the death
of Al Ra’is was primarily caused by a kiss—literally, a kiss of death—between
Abdel Hakim, a young Saudi man, and Kawthar, a young Tunisian woman. By
this account, the live broadcast of a kiss triggered active and vocal objections
to the program, including a demonstration in Bahrain’s capital Manama that,
according to witnesses I interviewed, included a couple of hundred men.
According to Islamist leaders, their main criticism was grounded in religious
morality. A conservative member of the Bahraini Parliament, Sheikh Adel alMawda, said of Al Ra’is, “This program showed an abnormal way of living,
which is totally opposed to our thoughts, culture, everything … It is not reality
TV at all, especially in our part of the world.”(28) This and other similar
statements suggest that the claims made on reality television programs that
they represent “reality” are contentious in themselves.(29) The dispute around
whether reality television does or does not represent reality, which I am
exploring in a different essay, suggests that notions of representation,
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specifically representations of “Arab society” or “Islamic society,” are being
contested publicly.
So far, the story seems to follow a familiar script: Islamic cleric opposes
popular culture that reflects Western values; in turn, religious “traditional”
society bows to religious edicts. However, the complexity of the Al Ra’is
episode comes to view when we consider that members of the Bahraini
parliament rose in defense of the program, and especially when we examine
the arguments they used. Defenders of Al Ra’is publicly argued that the
program would boost tourism to Bahrain and therefore contribute to economic
growth.(30) In a small country with dwindling energy reserves whose rulers are
betting its future prosperity on its status as a financial hub and the world’s
leading center for Islamic finance, arguments couched in the language of
economic pragmatism appeal to a section of the elite whose members feel
enough self-confidence to articulate publicly a discourse that contests and
offers an alternative to the Islamists. According to the daily The Bahrain
Times, a special parliamentary committee discussed the impact of Al Ra’is on
Bahraini society and considered “ways to protect investments and preserve
Bahrain’s Islamic ethics.”(31) The article then quoted the head of the
committee, Member of Parliament Ahmed Ibrahim Bahzad, whose words
reflect that the debate went beyond an opposition of Islamists to the culture
industry:
There are three distinct opinions about Big Brother, and they reflect the
vivacity of our society … There are people who reject the program
completely; the second section does not show any interest in the issue, while
the third group says that the focus should not be on the program but on the
participants … There are people who want to cancel the contract with the
producing companies, but this is opposed by the businessmen who fear that
such a decision would hurt Bahrain’s reputation and undermine potential
investment agreements.(32)

In the Arab context, references to “national reputation” arise in the context of
government suppression of political dissent or, less frequently, sexual content.
It is frequently used against journalists critical of government policies. Invoking
the trope of national reputation in reference to Bahrain’s fitness for investment
suggests a shift in Arab public discourse towards neo-liberal governance. This
is echoed in appeals to government efficiency and responsiveness to the
practical needs of citizens. In their opposition to the shutdown of Al Ra’is,
“liberal” Bahraini politicians countered the Islamists with socio-economic
arguments. Thus another member of Bahrain’s parliament, Abdullah al
Dossary, argued that “[T]here are other important issues to be tackled by the
deputies. Why all the fuss over a TV show? What happened to the citizens’
problems such as housing, salary improvement and education?”(33) This
attention to the every-day life concerns of the citizenry, with bigger economic
arguments in the background, indicate that a purely “culturalist,” in this case
Islamist, explanation of public debates about the impact of reality television
provides us with a partial understanding of an overall picture in which nonreligious forces contend with speakers in the name of Islam.(34)
The official explanation that came out of the Middle East Broadcasting Center
itself suggests that religion was not the dominant factor in their decision, or at
least that MBC management claims other reasons. Even after deciding to
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cancel Al Ra’is, MBC argued that the program “was more realistic in reflecting
the reality” of Arab youth than other reality television programs, adding a
business explanation to the controversy:
All new products need time to be accepted. In certain cases, they can be
wrongly interpreted … By this sacrifice, MBC does not want to risk, through
its programs and broadcasting, being accused of harming Arab traditions and
values, because it considers the channel one for the Arab family.(35)

This corporate statement reflects the importance of business considerations in
MBC’s decision to shut down the program. Its “family channel” brand risks
losing its luster if it keeps a program on the air that a probably small but
nonetheless vocal minority considered contrary to “family values.” The
mention of “sacrifice” finds its explanation in the official MBC statement
declaring a loss of $6 million because of the shutdown of Al Ra’is, an
enormous amount by regional standards, although the real figure is hard to
know. The invocation of “Arab traditions and values” is itself significant in that
Islam as such is not mentioned in the statement, in spite of the fact that
opposition to the program was mainly under the banner of its putative violation
of Islamic values.
One aspect of the Al Ra’is episode is grounded in one Islamic interpretation of
gender relations, which considers haram, or prohibited, the unsupervised
social mixing of men and women unmarried to each other, or ikhtilat.
Objections to the program, even though they were not always explicitly
articulated as such, focused on the fact that unmarried men and women lived
together in one house, creating potential for flirting, physical contact, and even
sexual intercourse that are considered illicit in some of the stricter
interpretations of Islamic texts. Bahrain being part of the more socially and
religiously conservative Gulf countries, although less conservative than Saudi
Arabia and Kuwait, it is not surprising that controversy erupted there over Al
Ra’is. As we will see shortly, producers could get away shooting a similar
show in Lebanon, where Star Academy was soon to become a regionally
unprecedented popular and commercial success story. As an American
reporter quipped:
Neither of the first two shows [Al-Hawa Sawa(36) and Star Academy] generated
quite the horror of ‘Big Brother,’ in part because they were broadcast from
Lebanon, which much of the Arab world considers depraved anyway.
Lebanon’s satellite networks already have a reputation for showing female
employees on air with minimal wardrobes.(37)

The remaining section of this article discusses how criticism of interactions
between men and women was at the center of the controversy surrounding
Star Academy.
Reality Television and Gender Relations
If Super Star showed popular culture as a site of resurgent nationalisms and
inter-Arab rivalries, and if Al Ra’is exposes the vulnerability of the Arab
satellite television industry, Star Academy demonstrates that a television
program can become a highly controversial public event that not only survives
its numerous critics but at the same time saturates Pan-Arab public discourse,
becoming a full-fledged media event.
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The Lebanese Broadcasting Corporation’s Star Academy is the Arabic version
of an original format owned by the Dutch format-house Endemol, which
became familiar to some Lebanese viewers through the 2002 French version
by the French broadcaster TF1.(38) Contestants in the first installment of Star
Academy (2003-2004), or, as they were officially called, “the students,” hailed
from Egypt, Kuwait, Lebanon, Morocco, Saudi Arabia and other Arab
countries.(39) The students took lessons in oral interpretation, dancing,
singing, music, fashion, hair-styling, and make-up. Every week, the teachers
designated two “nominees,” (the English word was used), and after a live
Friday night show performed by the students, the audience was asked to vote
for the nominee who they wanted to remain on the show. The other nominee
was in effect voted out of The Academy, the four-story building near LBC
headquarters in Adma, Lebanon. LBC management devoted regionally
unprecedented resources for the program, starting with a vast Pan-Arab
recruitment campaign that whittled 3,000 applicants to 16 finalists and a
prominent programming schedule, including nightly one hour “access” shows,
a weekly two-hour Friday “prime,” and a 24-hour satellite channel airing feeds
from the 60 cameras in The Academy’s building.(40) Several LBC executives,
including the network’s general manager Pierre al-Daher, indicated that Star
Academy was considered their flagship program and given marketing,
promotion, production and programming resources commensurate with this
status.(41)
Star Academy was an instant hit. Arabs young and old, men and women, rich
and poor, were enthralled for 18 weeks between December 2003 and April
2004.(42) During daily access shows, the streets of Beirut, Riyadh and Rabat
emptied out and restaurant owners complained that Star Academy was killing
their business during the lucrative dinner hours. The fever reached its highest
pitch on Friday night during the “prime” when “the students” performed,
including the two nominees, one of whom would be voted out at the end of the
broadcast. Arab youth created fan sites on the Internet, including discussion
boards where writers declared their undying love to Bruno, the Lebanese
contestant, and Sophia, the Moroccan participant, who for a while emerged as
the favorite heartthrob and sex-symbol, respectively. Rumors spread of a love
affair between Sophia and Bashar from Kuwait. The highly popular satellite
television music channels such as Rotana, Saudi-owned and Lebanon-based,
and Melody Hits, which is Egyptian-owned and based, displayed a flow of
love-and-hate messages sent via mobile phone text messages that appeared
on moving tickers at the bottom of the television screen.(43) Women’s daytime
talk-shows and men’s public affairs programs discussed the phenomenon.
According to market research companies, Star Academy grabbed 80 percent
of the 15 to 25 audience in Lebanon, and after a few weeks captured record
audiences in Saudi Arabia and other Gulf countries.(44)
Star Academy was as controversial as it was popular. Clerics and politicians
from Morocco to Iraq condemned it; electronic diatribes swirled against it in
cyberspace. In the wake of the transformation of Bashar al-Shatti, a Kuwaiti
contestant and penultimate finalist, into a Pan-Arab heartthrob, and after a
concert in Kuwait by Star Academy finalists, the Dean of the School of Islamic
Law and Shari’a at Kuwait University issued a religious opinion (fatwa)
condemning it. The Kuwaiti parliament discussed legislation to “protect
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morality” from Star Academy, and Islamist members of Parliament grilled the
Minister of Information and pressured him to resign for allowing the
broadcasts.(45) A Saudi columnist in the establishment daily Al Riyadh called
Star Academy “a whorehouse,” using epithets rarely printed in the Saudi
press, while an audio cassette tape, titled “The Academy of the Devil” and
carrying fiery sermons, was distributed by religious activists in Saudi
Arabia.(46) Religious leaders were inundated with requests for rulings on
whether it was haram or halal to watch and participate in the show. A Sunni
cleric from Lebanon claimed that the devil was present in the program. In what
amounted to a rare dissenting youth voice in a cyberspace, where young
people were overwhelmingly enamored with the show, an Islamist youth group
set up a website called No2StarAcademy.net.(47) As mentioned earlier, a
political party in Jordan close to the Muslim Brotherhood issued an official
statement against reality TV, accusing it of promoting American interests and
facilitating cultural globalization. Perhaps more importantly, the venerable and
official “Permanent Committee for Scientific Research and the Issuing of
Fatwas” in Saudi Arabia issued a lengthy fatwa, replete with citations from the
Koran and Hadith, prohibiting watching, discussing, voting in or participating in
Star Academy.(48)
The controversy surrounding Star Academy persisted and evolved into a highly
public debate about a variety of hot-button issues having to do with modernity
and tradition, social change and cultural identity. The program was not
banned; rather it continued, perhaps predictably, to grow in popularity. Talkshows invited clerics, psychologists and media professionals to debate the
show’s popularity and impact. The pages of the Pan-Arab press echoed with
praise or condemnation, or with comparisons between voting procedures in
Star Academy and governance and elections in Arab countries. The Internet
buzzed with discussion boards. During the second two months of the first Star
Academy [March and April 2004] Star Academy was invoked on television
talk-shows and in newspaper columns as a code word for contentious issues
such as Arab-Western relations, the status of women and youth, and elections.
In effect, Star Academy was appropriated as what I call an idiom of contention,
with important implications for the overlap between popular culture and politics
discussed below.
Reality Television and Public Contention
The political implications of transnational Arab reality television rest to a large
extent in the way that it draws out into the public sphere competing arguments
about politics, economics, culture, religion and the myriad interconnections
between the four. In that respect, reality television activates processes of
public contention at the regional, Pan-Arab level that nonetheless take distinct
shapes in the various national spheres in which they unfold. As we already
have seen, Superstar activated patriotic feelings that were manifest in
nationalistic rivalries.(49) The debate over Al Ra’is in Bahrain took the shape
of a struggle between Islamic interpretations of the good society and business
considerations of national reputation.(50) The controversy over Star Academy,
while taking a Pan-Arab character, was also articulated to issues that were
specific to individual countries. Thus the impassioned debate about Star
Academy 1 in Kuwait cannot be disassociated from the struggle for women’s
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political rights that was at a high pitch when a Kuwaiti contestant in Star
Academy was rising to the finale. Opponents to Star Academy and to Kuwait
women’s political rights were the same: The Islamists led by MP Walid alTabtaba’i. In both cases, Islamists “lost,” with Kuwaiti women winning political
rights in 2005 and Star Academy broadcasts continuing into Kuwait.(51) In
Lebanon, even on the screen of LBC itself, discussions about the role of the
media (educational or commercial?), the role of media policy (dirigiste or
laisser-faire?), and the role of parents (to prohibit their children from watching
Star Academy or to watch it with them?), were all conducted in the context of
the Star Academy controversy.(52)
Public contention involves making public claims over courses of collective
action, articulated as putative social values, in order to change or maintain the
status quo. Public contention is therefore a politically invested rhetorical space.
Because of its resounding success with Arab audiences, reality television is a
magnet for contentious politics, drawing contenders with conflicting ideologies
and asymmetrical symbolic resources, who use the introduction of reality
television and the debate surrounding it in order to advance their agendas by
attempting to redraw the boundaries of Arab public discourse. The re-definition
of “national reputation,” from a notion connoting “political unity and the
absence of dissent” to one meaning “readiness for foreign investment,”
suggests that boundaries are being redrawn. But whether reality television,
ostensibly a harbinger of “modern” political values and behaviors such as
voting and public debate, affects social change that ultimately contributes to
the democratization of Arab politics is an issue that can only be determined
with the benefit of historical hindsight and sustained empirical research. At the
moment, however, some political implications of Arab reality television can be
discerned in the programs discussed in this article.
Star Academy is, in many ways, a political program. It is political first in the
sense advanced by the “alternative future” explanation of the show’s
popularity, in that it stages an apparently fair competition whose participants
count on their personal initiative, creativity and skills, and whose winners are
determined by a popular vote. This “reality” is discordant with that of most
young Arabs, who are prevented from expressing their opinions, who get their
jobs because of connections and rarely because of competence, and where
power is wielded arbitrarily by unelected rulers and officials. In that sense,
according to this perspective, reality television is the harbinger of an
alternative future.(53) The theme song of the program, Jayee al Haqiqa (Truth
is on the Way), an Arabic version of Let the Sunshine In, from the soundtrack
of the movie Hair, is directly political, both in its lyrics, which decry a situation
of falsity that the forthcoming truth will expose, and visuals expressed in the
music video.(54)
The music video, directed by leading Lebanese director Nadine Labaki and
produced by Lebanese production house Talkies under the EMI label, appears
to confirm the song’s political tenor. Shot with a blue filter, the video features
the Star Academy contestants marching through streets, waving the flags of
their respective countries: The Lebanese flag with the cedar between two red
bands, the Tunisian with its white crescent and star on red background, the
Saudi with its white sword and Islamic script on green background. The video
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clearly connotes a youth political protest march, brandishing their fists, waving
flags, expressing discontent with their situation and invoking an alternative
reality dominated by truth, warmth and light.(55) Had Star Academy not
achieved enormous popularity, its content would not have articulated Arab
social, political and economic reality. Its huge following, however, made it
profoundly political.
Major events can inject an extra dose of politics into reality television
programs. When a car bomb killed Lebanon’s ex-Prime Minister Rafiq al-Hariri
in Beirut on February 14, 2005, both Super Star and Star Academy became
overtly political. The former stopped regular broadcasts and auditions for the
next year’s installment, and participants in several installments of the show
released what became known as “patriotic songs,” broadcast around the clock
by Future Television. The Hariri-owned channel was transformed into a fulltime media machine to glorify the martyr, help his son Saad Eddin’s coalition
to win a majority of Lebanese parliamentary seats in the 2005 legislative
elections, and maintain public pressure to get to “the Truth” about the
assassination of its founding owner.
Star Academy 2’s producers also strategically drew on al-Hariri’s
assassination. Roula Saad, director of Promotion and Marketing at LBC, who
doubles as the director of “The Academy,” curtly announced on the air: “Mr.
Hariri is dead. Lebanon is mourning.” The brevity ostensibly was intended to
allow the “students” to “stay focused” on the competition.(56) After a hiatus of
10 days of mourning, however, LBC resumed Star Academy with a “prime” on
Friday, January 25, 2005, which turned into a nationalistic fest with patriotic
songs performed participants in Star Academy 1 and 2, and ended with the
voting out of the Syrian contestant Joey.(57) Several newspapers commented
on the political connotations of that prime in a context where Syria was held
responsible for Hariri’s death, a suspicion which subsequently was formalized
in the report issued in October 2005 by a United Nations investigative team
headed by German judge Detlev Mehlis.
Conclusions
The various television programs discussed in this article and public discourse
around them suggests that Star Academy and its competitors are having an
impact on Arab public discourse and politics. But whether these overlaps
between popular culture and politics justify the argument that reality television
is “the best hope for democracy in the Arab world” remains to be
established.(58) The empirical investigation of the links between reality
television and democracy requires a strict operational definition of “democracy”
that falls outside of the scope of this article. It is an issue in need of further
research with the combined benefits of empirical depth and historical distance.
In the meantime, we can conclude this article with a few observations that can
be used as guidelines or at least as discussion points as research on this topic
advances.
First, a conceptual distinction must be made between “democracy of
participation” and “democracy of governance.” The former is a prerequisite to
the latter, but not a substitute. Reality television activates the former, but it is
so far doubtful that it will lead to the latter. Even in the case of the
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demonstrations that followed the assassination of Rafiq al-Hariri and forced
the resignation of then Lebanese Prime Minister Omar Karami, some social
uses of technology compelled by reality television (using mobile phones for
mobilizing and voting, etc.) played a role, but how decisive of a role is
something that remains to be explored. That viewers learn to use their mobile
phones to vote and even forge alliances is potentially significant, but many
other conditions, including functioning institutions, accountability mechanisms,
etc.—some that have nothing to do with television—have to be realized before
this leads to sustainable change that expands the avenues of inclusion and
participation in political processes. That viewers use their mobile phones to
vote for their favorite Super Star contestant does not necessarily turn them
into activists for democratic participation and governance.
Second, to the extent that voting via mobile phones is a major source of profit
for both mobile phone providers and television channels, reality television
poses a flagrant conflict between economic and political interests. Even though
telecommunications and television executives are prohibited by non-disclosure
agreements from revealing the number of calls made during reality television
voting, it is well known in both industries that a relatively small number of
voters are behind a relatively large volume of votes.(59) Those with high
incomes can vote a theoretically infinite number of times, which means that
the one-person, one-vote principle at the heart of democratic practice is
trampled over, and that wealthy people have more voting power than others.
This could skew results of all Arab reality shows in favor of the wealthy Gulf
countries, especially given that, as explained earlier, a nationalistic streak is
evident in voting patters.
Third, Arab media are controlled by the same business-political elite whose
interest in profit is inversely proportional to their interest in political change,
which would strip from them some of the privileges they otherwise would not
have if Arab countries were to develop more transparent governance
procedures. It is unlikely that the son-in-law of the Saudi king would allow the
television network he owns to proceed with shows that contribute, even
rhetorically and no matter how indirectly, to undermine the power structure in
Saudi Arabia, just as it is improbable that the owners of a Lebanese television
channel would allow expression of political dissent that may end up stripping
some of the privileges that the business elite received from its patronage of
the political class.(60)
Fourth, out of the three programs discussed in this article, the two that
survived controversy were produced in and broadcast from Lebanon, probably
the most “liberal” and “Western-oriented” of all Arab countries. Concepts and
language from reality television were present in the demonstrations following
the assassination of al-Hariri, which did lead to the resignation of a sitting
Prime Minister (Omar Karami), a rare occurrence in Arab politics. However,
had Hariri been a “regular” Arab politician, without a global business empire
and personal friendships with heads of state, and/or had the United States and
France not decided to collaborate on passing UN 1559 in the Security Council,
would the demonstrations have occurred or lasted as they long as they did
last? Also, the extent to which these events will have an enduring impact on
Lebanese politics, and whether similar events could occur in other Arab
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countries, are issues that have yet to be explored.
The political slogans of activists in the Arab world reflect a media-savvy
generation mindful of the advantages of encapsulating a political agenda in
one word: Kifaya, or “enough,” for political activist attempting to end Mubarak’s
long reign in Egypt; Al-‘An, or “now,” for Kuwaiti women unwilling to wait
longer to obtain their political rights; Al Haqiqa, or “the Truth,” for Lebanese
demonstrators pressing for the truth about the perpetrators of the bombing
that ended Hariri’s life. The laconic style of these political campaigns does
reflect, to some extent, the concise vocabulary of reality television (“nominee,”
“prime,” etc). It also is compatible with news media routines based on the
visual snapshot and the sound bite. In an age of the 24-hour news cycle, when
Arabs are being subjected to a combination of American plans to re-shape the
Middle East, activists understand and exploit the fact that a television camera
can protect them, at least temporarily, from harassment by the mukhabarat
(intelligence services) and assorted state apparatuses. However, more
research is needed to understand the scope, depth and impact of these new
information dynamics.
Fifth, analysts of the putative political implications of Arab reality television
may have a lesson to learn from the experience of media scholars, who went
through a period characterized by excessive optimism in the ability of viewers
to “empower” themselves by “subverting” media messages. Such scholars
now eschew the excesses of “active audience” theory.(61) Television viewers,
Web surfers and mobile phone users, prodded by reality television, participate
in television shows and express their opinions on the tickers of television
screens and on fan sites and discussion groups. They are indeed active and
creative in how they conduct these activities, but whether this leads to a
significant and sustainable opening at the political level, and whether
participation in reality shows leads to long-term civic or political participation
that in turn leads to systemic and sustainable changes in Arab governance,
remains to be seen.
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NOTES
1. The boundaries of the reality television genre are notoriously porous. In this
article the moniker “reality television” refers to programs that have defined
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themselves as “reality television,” which applies more to Star Academy and Al
Ra’is than to Super Star. However, the latter was included in discussions of
reality television in Arab public discourse, and therefore in this study.
2. Because of space considerations, it is impossible to include verbatim
material from the interviews and detailed textual analyses in this chapter,
which will have to await the book-length treatment.
3. Marwan M. Kraidy, Screens of Contention: Arab Media and the Challenges
of Modernity, book manuscript in progress.
4. Neil Gabler, Life the Movie: How Entertainment Conquered Everyday Life
(New York, 1998).
5. Tash ma Tash is produced privately for Saudi TV, but was broadcast by
MBC during the 2005 Ramadan season. Other controversial Ramadan
programs include Al Hawr Al-Ayn, a Syrian dramatic series broaching the
phenomenon of terrorism in Arab societies, also broadcast by MBC, which
generated heated debate from the mainstream Saudi press to radical Islamist
internet fora.
6. Arvind Rajagopal, Politics after Television: Hindu Nationalism and the
Reshaping of the Public in India (Cambridge, 2001)
7. For discussions of this issue in various regions of the world see Nestor
García-Canclini, Consumers and Citizens: Globalization and Multicultural
Conflicts (Minneapolis, 2001) and Jesus Martín-Barbero, From the Media to
Mediations: Communication, Culture and Hegemony (London, 1993) for Latin
American; for India, Walter Armbrust, Mass Culture and Modernism in Egypt
(Cambridge, 1996) and Lila-Abu Lughod, Dramas of Nationhood: The Politics
of Television in Egypt (Chicago, 2005), for Egypt; Marwan M. Kraidy, Hybridity,
or the Cultural Logic of Globalization (Philadelphia, 2005), pp 116-147, for
Lebanon, and Patrick D. Murphy and Marwan M. Kraidy, Global Media Studies:
Ethnographic Perspectives (London, 2003) for various other regions and
countries, including Lebanon and Mexico.
8. John Street, Politics and Popular Culture, (Philadelphia, 1997), p. 10. Also,
the globalization of American political campaigning and electioneering
practices, with their heavy reliance on television, should also be mentioned as
a factor tightening the connections between politics and popular culture
worldwide.
9. “Visions of the good society” include an Islamist order based on the life of
the salaf, or ancestors from the early days of Islam, and the freedom to make
money for media corporations.
10. The Arabic name adds another layer to the Orwellian connotation of the
name Big Brother, since Al-Ra’is means “president” or “leader” in Arabic, and
has the same root with the word ra’s, Arabic for “head.”
11. For more on the regionalization of Arab media, see Jon Alterman (1998)
New Media, New Politics? (Washington, DC), Marwan M. Kraidy (2002). Arab
Satellite Television Between Globalization and Regionalization, Global Media
Journal, 1, 1, Naomi Sakr, Satellite Realms: Transnational Television,
Globalization and the Middle East (London, 2002), and Marwan M. Kraidy and
Joe F. Khalil (2006, forthcoming), “Current Trends in the Arab Television
Industry,” in Media Globe: Trends in International Media, Y. Kamalipour and L.
Artz (Eds.), Lanham, MD, Rowman and Littlefield.
12. Made possible by satellite technology, this regionalization is driven by
economic calculations. In news, regionalization has created an “anywhere but
here” trend whereby satellite television channels tend to criticize all
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governments, politicians, etc, except those from the country in which they are
based. It is well known, for example, that Al Jazeera’s editorial line, which is
critical of Arab governments, rarely raises questions about Qatari affairs,
especially government performance. However, Al Jazeera’s relentless criticism
of Saudi Arabia’s rulers creates a kind of “asymmetrical interdependence”
between Qatar and Saudi Arabia by giving more influence to the former. In
that context, the creation of Al Arabiya by the Saudis aims at restoring the
asymmetry to its fullness between Qatar and Saudi Arabia by undermining Al
Jazeera’s influence. For a detailed discussion of these issues, see Marwan M.
Kraidy and Joe F. Khalil (2006, forthcoming), “Current Trends in the Arab
Television Industry,” in Media Globe: Trends in International Media, Y.
Kamalipour and L. Artz (Eds.), Lanham, MD, Rowman and Littlefield.
13. The logistical complexities inherent in reality television programs has led to
the rise of the position of “executive producer” in Arab television to supervise
all the “story producers” and other “producers” whose task focuses on a single
aspect of a reality show. For this insight I am indebted to Joe Khalil, who was
recently creative director for a reality television program at MBC in Dubai.
14. For a detailed discussion of hybrid media programs, see Marwan M.
Kraidy, Hybridity, or, the Cultural Logic of Globalization (Philadelphia, 2005),
pp 97-115.
15. The discussion will refer mostly to the first installment of Super Star in
2003, later dubbed Superstar 1 in light of newer seasons of the program.
When subsequent installment are discussed, they are referred to as Super
Star 2 or Super Star 3. Simon Cowell is the acerbic leader of the panel of
judges in American Idol, the US version of the same program.
16. Among other reports on this issue, see Bassem Mroue, “Arab world’s
version of American Idol has nationalistic bent”
17. I discovered that there is a consensus among media professionals and
journalistic critics of television that Super Star featured “real voices,” while Star
Academy featured contestants with flamboyant or camera-friendly
personalities, but with lower-caliber voices. Press commentary expresses the
same consensus.
18. “Arab Idol a Battle of Nations,” Beirut, Associated Press, 18 August 2003.
For a more detailed treatment of how Super Star was received in Syria, see
Tyler MacKenzie, The Best Hope for Democracy in the Arab World: a
Crooning TV "Idol"? Transnational Broadcasting Studies (13), 2004.
19. “Arab Idol a Battle of Nations,” Beirut, Associated Press, 18 August 2003.
20. In order to vote, viewers call “toll” numbers, with a charge several times
higher than the price of a normal phone call. Profits are divided according to
pre-set agreements between television channels and telecommunications
companies.
21. “Pan-Arab song contest fuels passions in Jordan,” 17 August 2003, Jordan
Times.
22. Idol a Battle of Nations, Beirut, Associated Press, 18 August 2003.
23. Maalouf, Lynn (2004, January 14). “Western television craze makes
assured debut on region’s networks,” Daily Star.
24. Abou Nasr, Maya (2004, 4 February). “Who wants to be a Superstar?
12,000 do,” Daily Star. According to the same source, the fever carried
through into the next season: Responding to casting calls on the screens of
Future Television, 60,000 people applied and 40,000 auditioned for Super Star
2.
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25. Habeas, Abed, “Palestinian singing finalist tunes into nationalism,”
Associated Press/ Boston Globe, 23 August 2004
26. These include Western press reports and newspaper articles throughout
the Arab world.
27. MBC staff ––from management to the producers and directors involved in
Al Ra’is–– were reluctant to discuss the issue during personal interviews I
conducted in Dubai in 2004 and 2005. However, information gleaned in
fieldwork leads me to believe that there were factors internal to MBC that
contributed to the controversy, to be discussed in the book-length treatment.
Other factors to be explored in the larger study could include ever-present
tensions between the majority Shiis and ruling Sunnis in Bahrain.
28. MacFarqhar, Neil, “A kiss is not just a kiss to an angry Arab TV audience,”
The New York Times, 5 March 2004.
29. Reality television’s claim to be “real” is an issue that has received
significant scholarly attention, for example in Mark Andrejevic, Reality TV: The
Work of Being Watched (Lanham, MD, 2004) and Annette Hill, Reality TV:
Audiences and Popular Factual Television (London, 2005). In my ongoing
book project mentioned in the first note, I argue that this issue is even more
important in the Arab context where defining social reality is a highly
contentious matter as it is at the heart of issues of cultural and religious
authenticity and Arab and Islamic relations with the Western world.
30. MacFarqhar, Neil, “A kiss is not just a kiss to an angry Arab TV audience,”
The New York Times, 5 March 2004.
31. “The reality of Reality TV in the Middle East,” www.albawaba.com/
news/printArticle.php3?sid= 271966&lang=e, 7 March 2004.
32. “The reality of Reality TV in the Middle East,” www.albawaba.com/
news/printArticle.php3?sid= 271966&lang=e, 7 March 2004.
33. “The reality of Reality TV in the Middle East,” www.albawaba.com/
news/printArticle.php3?sid= 271966&lang=e, 7 March 2004.
34. The socio-economic arguments could be described as “emergent” while
Islamist claims can be said to be “established,” a distinction admittedly in need
of elaboration. While in this case the show was canceled, the fact that Gulf
Arab politicians opposed public claims that shroud themselves in religion is
significant, as is MBC’s rhetorical gesture to use “Arab” as “opposed” to
“Islamic” in its corporate statement, even when there is connotative overlap
between the two adjectives.
35. “The reality of Reality TV in the Middle East,” www.albawaba.com/
news/printArticle.php3?sid= 271966&lang=e, 7 March 2004.
36. Al Hawa Sawa was a match-making program produced by Arab Radio and
Television (ART) in which 8 single women competed for a marriage proposal.
The program was shot in Lebanon.
37. MacFarqhar, Neil, “A kiss is not just a kiss to an angry Arab TV audience,”
The New York Times, 5 March 2004. Al-Hawa Sawa, an Arab reality television
pioneer, featured a group pf unmarried women competing for a husband.
38. Because a large section of the Lebanese population is Francophone and
some of it Francophile, the low-cost pirate cable operations offer a variety of
French channel as part of their line-up.
39. While the discussion moves between Star Academy 1 (2003-2004) and
Star Academy 2 (2004-2005), the first installment was a greater Pan-Arab
media event, but the latter was more explicitly politicized in the wake of Hariri’s
assassination.
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40. Personal interview with Roula Saad, Director of Promotion, Lebanese
Broadcasting Corporation, Adma, Lebanon, 5 July 2005.
41. In addition to LBC boss Pierre al-Daher, whom I interviewed on July 5,
2005 and August 21, 2005, and Director of Promotion Roula Saad (5 July
2005), these include Sebouh Alavanthian (5 July 2005), director of the
programming department, and Ronny Jazzar, president of Star Wave, an LBC
affiliated production and promotion house (mid-July 2005).
42. Personal interviews I conducted with audience researchers at IPSOSSTAT OMD and PARC in Dubai and Beirut, June 2004 and June 2005,
confirm what Sebouh Alavanthian, Director of the Programming Department at
LBC, claimed: that Star Academy was successful with all demographic
segments, although it particularly drew young viewers.
43. The overwhelming majority of text messages come from countries in the
Gulf Cooperation Council, mostly from Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and the United
Arab Emirates, which suggests a positive link between income levels and
volume of text-messages.
44. Personal interviews conducted by the author with audience researchers at
IPSOS-STAT OMD and PARC in Dubai and Beirut, June 2004 and June 2005.
45. The Kuwaiti information minister did lose his job in March 2005, in a
cabinet reshuffle triggered by (among other factors) the powerful Islamic bloc
in parliament wanted him out, and the new Minister stated he will reactivate a
“unit” at the Ministry to “monitor” music videos and reality TV shows for
offensive content. It is useful that Kuwait was then witnessing the peak of the
struggle for women’s political rights, which mobilized the Islamist political
constituency.
46. Al-Dakhil, Mounira Mohammad, “Destructive Academy is Harmful to the
Family,” al-Riyadh, 27 February 2005.
47. This site was very active during the first season of Star Academy but has
since then been taken off the World Wide Web.
48. While the Permanent Committee has issued opinion about mass media
issues in the past, this is to my knowledge the first time that an entire fatwa is
devoted to a single television program.
49. Technical developments such as Multimedia Messaging System (MMS)
have encouraged national identification by inserting on the television ticker, a
coloured flag of the country from which the call was made.
50. Interviews with five media professionals involved in the program indicate
that there are other factors having to do with the interlocking media and
political elites in Saudi Arabia, but these sources requested anonymity and
asked that this issue not be discussed in detail at this time.
51. In a compromise with the Islamists, Star Academy 2 finalists did not give a
concert in Kuwait. The concert given by Star Academy 1 finalists in Kuwait
was the lightening rod of the Islamists. Some might also say that the law
giving Kuwait women their political rights compromised with the Islamists
when it stipulated that women’s political participation was to be framed by
vaguely mentioned “Islamic principles.”
52. See for instance, the 7 March 2004, episode of the news show Al-Hadath,
in which a Saudi journalist, a Lebanese advertising executive, a Lebanese
psychoanalyst and LBC’s Director of Promotion and Marketing, debated the
program, interspersed with reports about the reception of Star Academy in
various Arab countries.
53. There were many articles in the Western and Arab press presenting this
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argument, the latest being Carla Power, “Look Who’s Talking,” Newsweek
International, 8 August 2005, pp 50-51. While this argument is worth
considering, we should certainly be cautious not to exaggerate the
democratizing impact of reality television, or at least give some time for
systematic research on the topic before we make optimistic claims.
54. Again, caution is advisable in evaluating the political impact of this video
clip, in distinction from its political connotations.
55. In hindsight, the visuals of the video clip bear an uncanny resemblance to
the Beirut demonstrations in the spring of 2005, with the exception that in the
video clip many Arab flags were waived while in Beirut all flags were
Lebanese.
56. Various news stories in the Lebanese and Pan-Arab press in the second
half of February 2005, including Annahar, Assafir and Al-Hayat.
57. At that time tensions between Syria and Lebanon reached their peak since
the early 1990s, as there was a widespread suspicion that Syria contributed
one way or another to al-Hariri’s death. What occurred on the Star Academy 2
stage reflected popular discontent with Syria in Lebanon. Contrary to the
clapping and dancing that usually accompanies the exit of a losing contestant,
the amphitheater where the primes are shot was fully silent as the Syrian
contestant stepped out.
58. I am referring here to Tyler MacKenzie, The Best Hope for Democracy in
the Arab World: a Crooning TV "Idol"? Transnational Broadcasting Studies
(13), 2004.
59. The amount of profit derived from voting is the best-guarded secret in the
industry, and even journalists who cover the media offer informed speculation.
Everyone I interviewed however agrees that significant profits are made from
voting, and that in some cases they exceed advertising revenues.
60. " In Saudi Arabia and Lebanon, as in most other Arab countries, the media
elite interlocks with the political elite, either through business or family
relations."
61. A detailed discussion of the many ebbs and flows of this debate can be
found in Patrick D. Murphy and Marwan M. Kraidy, Editors (2003). Global
Media Studies: Ethnographic Perspectives. London: Routledge.
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